We investigate the topological interpretation of modal logic in modern terms, using a new notion of bisimulation. Next, we look at modal logics with interesting topological content, presenting, amongst others, a new proof of McKinsey and Tarski's theorem on completeness of S4 with respect to the real line, and a completeness proof for the logic of finite unions of convex sets of reals. We conclude with a broader picture of extended modal languages of space, for which the main logical questions are still wide open.
Introduction and purpose
The topological interpretation is one of the oldest semantics for modal languages. Reading the modal box as an interior operator, one can easily show that the modal logic S4 is complete with respect to arbitrary topological spaces. But there are classical results with much more mathematical content, such as McKinsey and Tarski's beautiful theorem that S4 is also the complete logic of the reals, and indeed of any metric separable space without isolated points. Even so, the topological interpretation has always remained something of a side-show in modal logic and intuitionistic logic, often tucked away in notes and appendices. The purpose of this paper is to take it one step further as a first stage in a program of independent interest, viz. the modal analysis of space -showing how one can get more generality, as well as some nice new questions. In particular, this paper contains (a) a modern analysis of the modal language as a topological formalism in terms of 'topo-bisimulation' (continuing [1] ), (b) a number of connections between topological models and Kripke models, (c) a new proof of McKinsey and Tarski's Theorem (inspired by [17] ), (d) an analysis of special topological logics on the reals, pointing toward a landscape of spatial logics above S4, and finally (e) an extension to richer modal languages of space, and their increased expressive power.
2 Modal language and topological semantics
Language and axioms
Let us first set the scene where we will operate. The basic language L of propositional modal logic is composed of
• a countable set of proposition letters,
• boolean connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, →,
• modal operators 2, 3.
The standard axiomatization of our central logic S4 is
Modus Ponens and Necessitation are the only rules of inference:
For a closer fit to topological reasoning, however, it is better to work with an equivalent axiomatization of S4:
Modus Ponens and Monotonicity are the only rules of inference:
As we shall see in a moment, these principles are valid in all topological spaces when we let formulas range over sets of points, with the Booleans as the obvious set operations, modal box as interior and dually, modal diamond as closure. On top of this base set, further modal axioms can be used to express more special topological properties. E.g., an additional 'axiom'
2ϕ ↔ ϕ would say that each set is open, meaning that the spaces satisfying it have the discrete topology.
Topological completeness
The first semantic completeness proof for S4 did not use the by now dominant relational modal models, which go back to Kanger, Hintikka, and Kripke in the 1950s. It was actually an earlier spatial completeness argument of [16] , in terms of the following notions. Recall that a topological space is a pair W, τ , where W is a non-empty set and τ a collection of subsets of W satisfying the following three conditions:
• ∅, W ∈ τ ,
• if U, V ∈ τ , then U ∩ V ∈ τ ,
• if {U i } i∈I ∈ τ , then i∈I U i ∈ τ .
Let Int(X) and X be the topological interior and closure operators of W, τ respectively. It is well-known (cf. [13] ) that these satisfy the following clauses for all X, Y ⊆ W :
Moreover, there is a duality Int(X) = W − W − X, and a topological space can also be defined in terms of an interior operator, or a closure operator satisfying the above four clauses.
McKinsey and Tarski defined a valuation ν of formulas of L into W, τ by putting
• ν(¬ϕ) = W − ν(ϕ),
• ν(ϕ ∨ ψ) = ν(ϕ) ∪ ν(ψ),
• ν(ϕ ∧ ψ) = ν(ϕ) ∩ ν(ψ),
• ν(ϕ → ψ) = (W − ν(ϕ)) ∪ ν(ψ),
• ν(2ϕ) = Int(ν(ϕ)),
• ν(3ϕ) = ν(ϕ).
In definitions and arguments in this paper, we will often economize, and leave out the clauses for disjunction, implication and modal diamond, as these are automatic from the others. Now, call a triple M = W, τ, ν a topological model. A formula ϕ is said to be true in such a model M if ν(ϕ) = W , and we say that ϕ is topologically valid if it is true in every topological model. Referring to the second axiomatization of S4, which highlights the interior operator, one easily sees its soundness:
If S4 ϕ, then ϕ is topologically valid.
McKinsey and Tarski's pioneering achievement [16] was a proof of completeness (for a new proof, see Section 4 below):
If ϕ is topologically valid, then S4 ϕ.
Hence, for a modal logician, the topological semantics is adequate for S4, or -the other side of the same coin: for a topologist, S4 axiomatizes the algebra of the interior operator completely.
The semantics amplified
In the rest of this paper, we will use the more modern format for a modal semantics. Given a topological model M = W, τ, ν , we state what it means for a given formula ϕ to be true in a point w:
• w |= P iff w ∈ ν(P ),
• w |= ¬ϕ iff not w |= ϕ,
• w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff w |= ϕ and w |= ψ,
• w |= 2ϕ iff (∃U ∈ τ )(w ∈ U and (∀v ∈ U )(v |= ϕ)), and hence also
• w |= 3ϕ iff (∀U ∈ τ )(w ∈ U ⇒ (∃v ∈ U )(v |= ϕ)).
This semantics for the modal language looks different from the usual one, where models have a binary accessibility relation between points, and w |= 2ϕ if ϕ is true in all relational successors of w. Nevertheless, there are strong analogies, which we will sketch in Section 3. Indeed, all basic notions from relational Kripke models make sense for the topological semantics, too. Here are two typical examples that we shall need further on.
The topological semantics is local in that the truth value of a formula at a point w only depends on what happens inside the open neighborhoods of that point. More precisely, consider any topological model M with a point w inside, which lies in some open set U . Now define the obvious restriction of M to a topological model M |U by taking U for the new universe, letting the open sets be all the old open sets inside U , and putting ν (P ) = ν(P ) ∩ U . It is easy to show by induction on formulas that w |= ϕ in M iff w |= ϕ in M |U .
Thus, e.g., to determine truth values for modal formulas at a point w on the real line, we only need to know how the model behaves in arbitrarily small open neighborhoods around w. Or conversely, we can change the model at a distance from a point w, without affecting the original truth values.
Our second illustration concerns the proper semantic invariance for our modal language. The connection between M and M |U is a special case of a more general model relation investigated at length in [1] , including versions in terms of Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games.
Definition 2.1 (topological bisimulation)
Suppose two topological models X, τ, ν , X , τ , ν are given. A topological bisimulation is a nonempty relation ∼⊆ X × X such that if x ∼ x then (base):
x ∈ ν(P ) iff x ∈ ν (P ) (for any variable P )
As an example, the identity relation on U is a topo-bisimulation between the above models M and M |U . This also shows that the preceding definition does not require totality: some points need not have links at all. But much rougher 'contractions' and 'twists' are also possible. In general, topobisimulation is a coarse notion of similarity between topological spaces, much less fine-grained than homeomorphism or homotopy. But it is just right for the expressive power of the modal language: Fact 2.2 If ∼ is a topo-bisimulation between two models M , N such that s ∼ t, then s, t satisfy the same modal formulas.
The statement of true versions of converse results is a much more delicate matter (cf. [7] and [10] ). Here we give just one simple illustration: Fact 2.3 If two worlds s and t satisfy the same modal formulas in two finite models M , N , then there exists a topo-bisimulation between these models which connects s with t.
Extended modal languages
One striking feature of modern modal logic, which differs from earlier phases, is the use of languages with additional modal operators. This is an obvious move when thinking about modal languages for describing topological structure: one may want to express more than just the bare facts of interior and closure, while still sticking to the perspicuity of S4 and its ilk. Here is one simple extension. One can add a universal modality U ϕ expressing that ϕ holds in all worlds of the model, and a dual existential modality Eϕ expressing that ϕ holds in at least one world. This allows us to express new topological properties, such as connectedness:
Recall that a topological space W, τ is said to be connected if W can not be represented as the union of two disjoint open sets. As was shown independently in [19] and in [1] , the 'defining' formula of connectedness is:
Note that connectedness is not definable in our basic language, as its failures are not invariant for topo-bisimulation. But one can easily strengthen topo-bisimulations to deal with this richer modal language, and one can also extend the logic S4 to a complete system for it, adding amongst others the axioms of S5 for U , E. We will return to such expressive extensions in Section 7.2. For more extensive information, cf. [4, 19, 1] .
Topological spaces and Kripke models
The purpose of this section is a link-up with the better-known world of 'standard' semantics for modal logic. At the same time, this comparison increases our understanding of the 'topological content' of modal logic. What follows can be safely skipped by readers who already know, or do not care.
The basic connection
The standard Kripke semantics for S4 is a particular case of its more general topological semantics. Recall that an S4-frame (henceforth 'frame', for short) is a couple W, R , where W is a non-empty set and R a quasi-order (transitive and reflexive) on W . Call a set X ⊆ W upward closed if w ∈ X and wRv imply v ∈ X. Fact 3.1 Every frame W, R induces a topological space W, τ R , where τ R is the set of all upward closed subsets of W, R .
It is easy to check that τ R is a topology on W , and that the closure and interior operators of W, τ R are respectively R −1 (X) and W −R −1 (W −X), where R −1 (w) = {v ∈ W : vRw} and R −1 (X) = w∈X R −1 (w), for w ∈ W , X ⊆ W . Indeed, τ R is a rather special topology on W : for any family {X i } i∈I ⊆ τ R , we have i∈I X i ∈ τ R . Such spaces are called Alexandroff spaces, in which every point has a least neighborhood. In frames, the least neighborhood of a point w is evidently {v ∈ W : wRv}, which is usually denoted by R(w).
Conversely, every topological space W, τ naturally induces a quasiorder R τ defined by putting
This is called the specialization order in the topological literature. Again it is easy to check that R τ is transitive and reflexive, and that every open set of τ is R τ -upward closed. Moreover, R τ is anti-symmetric iff W, τ satisfies the T 0 separation axiom (that is, any two different points are separated by an open set). Hence R τ is a partial order iff W, τ is a T 0 -space.
Combining the two mappings, R = R τ R , τ ⊆ τ Rτ , and τ = τ Rτ iff W, τ is an Alexandroff space. Indeed, wR τ R v iff w ∈ {v} iff w ∈ R −1 (v) iff wRv. Also, as every open set of τ is R τ -upward closed, τ ⊆ τ Rτ . Finally, τ = τ Rτ iff every R τ -upward closed set belongs to τ iff every point of W has a least neighborhood in W, τ iff W, τ is an Alexandroff space.
The upshot of all this is a one-to-one correspondence between quasiordered sets and Alexandroff spaces, and between partially ordered sets and Alexandroff T 0 -spaces. Since every finite topological space is an Alexandroff space, this immediately gives a one-to-one correspondence between finite quasi-ordered sets and finite topological spaces, and finite partially ordered sets and finite T 0 -spaces.
There is also a one-to-one correspondence between continuous maps and order preserving maps, as well as open maps and p-morphisms. Indeed, let two topological spaces W 1 , τ 1 and W 2 , τ 2 be given. Recall that a function f :
is open if it is continuous and f (U ) ∈ τ 2 for every U ∈ τ 1 . It is wellknown that f is continuous iff f −1 (X) ⊆ f −1 (X), and that f is open iff f −1 (X) = f −1 (X), for every X ⊆ W 2 .
Next, for two quasi-orders W 1 , R 1 and W 2 , R 2 , f : W 1 → W 2 is said to be order preserving if wR 1 v implies f (w)R 2 f (v), for w, v ∈ W 1 . f is a p-morphism if it is order preserving, and in addition f (w)R 2 v implies that there exists u ∈ W 1 such that wR 1 u and f (u) = v, for w ∈ W 1 and v ∈ W 2 . It is well-known that f is order preserving iff R
2 (w), and that f is a p-morphism iff R
2 (w), for every w ∈ W 2 . Putting this together, one easily sees that f is monotone iff f is continuous, and that f is p-morphism iff f is open.
As an easy consequence we obtain that the category ATop of Alexandroff spaces and continuous maps is isomorphic to the category Qos of quasi ordered sets and order preserving maps, and that the category 
Analogies qua topics
The tight connection between modal frames and topological spaces explains the earlier-mentioned analogies in their semantic development, such as locality and invariance for bisimulation. It may be extended to include other basic modal topics, such as correspondence theory [6] . Likewise, the modern move toward extended modal languages makes equally good sense for the topological interpretation. Many natural topological notions need extra modal power for their definition: good examples are the basic separation axioms. We just saw that, among the quasi orders, partial orders correspond to topological spaces satisfying the T 0 separation axiom. But this difference does not show up in our basic modal language: S4 is complete with respect to arbitrary partial orders. Defining separation axioms requires various expressive extensions of the modal base language.
Finally, in a more technical sense, there still seems a vast difference. The format of the topological interpretation looks more complex than the usual one which quantifies over accessible worlds only. For, it involves a second-order quantification over sets of worlds, plus a first-order quantification over their members. But this difference is more apparent than real, because the quantification is over open sets only, and we may plausibly think of topological models as two-sorted first-order models with separate domains of 'points' and 'opens'. To bring this out more directly, one might also use an alternative 'bi-modal language' with two separate modalities: <U> ("for some open neighborhood of the current point"), [x] ("for all points in the current open set"). (Cf. [15, 12, 1] for this decomposition.) On this approach, however, the base logic is no longer S4!
General Completeness
The preceding section shows that standard modal models are a particular case of a more general topological semantics. Hence, the known completeness of S4 plus the topological soundness of its axioms immediately give us general topological completeness. Even so, we now give a direct modeltheoretic proof of this result. It is closely related to the standard modal Henkin construction, but with some nice topological twists. (Compare [11] for the quite analogous case of modal 'neighborhood semantics'.)
The main argument
Soundness is immediate, and hence we move directly to completeness. Call a set Γ of formulas of L (S4-)consistent if for no finite set {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } ⊆ Γ we have that S4 ¬(ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n ). A consistent set of formulas Γ is called maximally consistent if there is no consistent set of formulas properly containing Γ. It is well-known that Γ is maximally consistent iff, for any formula ϕ of L, either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ, but not both. Now we define a topological space out of maximally consistent sets of formulas.
• W L is the set of all maximally consistent sets Γ max ;
• τ L is the set generated by arbitrary unions of the following basic sets
In other words, basic sets are the families of the form:
Let us first check that S L is indeed a topological space.
Lemma 4.2 B L forms a basis for the topology.
Proof. We only need to show the following two properties:
Now, (N) implies that 2 ∈ Γ max , for any Γ max . Hence W L = 2 and the second item is satisfied. As for the first item, thanks to (R), one can easily check that 2(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 2ϕ ∩ 2ψ. Hence U ϕ ∩ U ψ ∈ B L , and so B L is closed under finite intersections: whence the first item is satisfied. q.e.d.
Next we define the canonical topological model.
• S L is the canonical topological space;
The valuation ν L equates truth of a proposition letter at a maximally consistent set with its membership in that set. We now show this harmony between the two viewpoints lifts to all formulas.
Lemma 4.4 (Truth lemma)
Proof. Induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case was just described. The case of the Booleans follows from the following well-known identities for maximally consistent sets:
The interesting case is that of the modal operator 2. We do the two relevant implications separately, starting with the easy one.
⇐ 'From membership to truth.' Suppose w ∈ 2ϕ. By definition, 2ϕ is a basic set, hence open. Moreover, thanks to axiom (T), 2ϕ ⊆ ϕ. Hence there exists an open neighborhood U = 2ϕ of w such that for any v ∈ U , v ∈ ϕ, and by the induction hypothesis,
Then there exists a basic set 2ψ ∈ B L such that w ∈ 2ψ and for all v ∈ 2ψ, M L , v |= L ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, ∀v ∈ 2ψ, v ∈ ϕ: i.e., 2ψ ⊆ ϕ. But this implies that the logic S4 can prove the implication 2ψ → ϕ. (If not, then there would be some maximally consistent set containing both 2ψ and ¬ϕ.) But then we can prove the implication 22ψ → 2φ, and hence, using the S4 transitivity axiom, 2ψ → 2φ. It follows that 2ψ ⊆ 2φ, and hence the world w belongs to 2φ. q.e.d. Now we can clinch the proof of our main result. 
Proof. Suppose that Γ S4 ϕ. Then Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent, and by the Lindenbaum Lemma it can be extended to a maximally consistent set Γ max . By the Truth Lemma, M L , Γ max |= L ¬ϕ, whence Γ max |= L ϕ, and we have constructed the required counter-model. q.e.d.
Topological comments
Let us now look at some topological aspects of this construction. In proving the box case of Truth Lemma, we did not use the standard modal argument, which crucially invokes the distribution axiom of the minimal modal logic. Normally, one shows that, if a formula 2φ does not belong to a maximally consistent set Γ, then there exists some maximally consistent successor set of Γ containing ¬ϕ. This is not necessary in the topological version at this stage. We only needed the reflexivity and transitivity axioms, plus the Lindenbaum Lemma on maximally consistent extensions. The modal distribution axiom still plays a crucial role, but that was at the earlier stage of verifying that we had really defined a topology. This different way of 'cutting the cake' provides an additional proof-theoretic explanation why S4 is the weakest axiom system complete for topological semantics. Moreover, the divergence with the 'standard' argument explodes the prejudice that one single 'well-known' interpretation for a language must be the only natural one.
Comparing our construction with the standard modal Henkin model for
Hence every open of S L is R L -upward closed, and S L is weaker than the topology τ R L corresponding to R L . In particular, our canonical topological space is not an Alexandroff space.
Here are some further topological aspects of the above construction. First, it is worthwhile to compare Stone's famous construction which uses the alternative basis { ϕ : ϕ any formula}, yielding a space which we denote by W L , τ S . It is well-known that W L , τ S is homeomorphic to the Cantor space -and so, up to homeomorphism, W L , τ S is compact, metric, 0-dimensional, and dense-in-itself. The basis of our topology, however, was the sub-family { 2ϕ : ϕ any formula}. Now every subtopology of one that is compact and dense-in-itself is also compact and dense-in-itself. Therefore, we get these same properties for our canonical topological space. But we can be more precise than this. 
In other words
One can also connect modal formulas and topological properties more directly, by giving a direct proof of the fact that S L is compact and densein-itself. The former fact goes just as for the Stone space, but we display it for the sake of illustration.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then there is a family { 2ψ i } i∈I ⊆ B L such that i∈I 2ψ i = W L , and for no finite subfamily { 2ψ i 1 , . . . , 2ψ in } we have
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then there is a finite number of formulas
Since Γ is consistent, it can be extended to a maximally consistent set Γ max . Obviously ¬2ψ i ∈ Γ max for any i ∈ I. Hence Γ max ∈ ¬2ψ i for any
Proof. Suppose there was an isolated point w in S L . Then there is a formula 2ϕ with 2ϕ = {w}. This means 2ϕ ∈ w and for any ψ, ψ ∈ w iff S4 2ϕ → ψ, which is obviously a contradiction -since we are working in a language with infinitely many propositional letters. q.e.d.
Corollary 4.10 S4 is the logic of the class of all topological spaces which are compact and dense-in-itself.
Still, the canonical topological space S L is neither 0-dimensional nor metric (it is not even a T 0 -space). So, S L is not homeomorphic to the Cantor space. In the next section, we will show how to get completeness of S4 with respect to the Cantor space by a different route.
Finite spaces suffice
We conclude with an observation that is important for later arguments. The whole construction in the completeness proof would also work if we restricted attention to the finite language consisting of the initial formula and all its subformulas. All definitions go through, and our arguments never needed to go beyond it. This means that we only get finitely many maximally consistent sets, and so non-provable formulas can be refuted on finite models, whose size is effectively computable from the formula itself. (Note however that the obtained finite model won't necessarily be dense-in-itself.) Corollary 4.11 S4 has the effective finite model property w.r.t. the class of topological spaces.
Incidentally, this also shows that validity in S4 is decidable, but we forego such complexity issues in this paper.
The resulting models have some interesting topological extras. Consider any finite modal frame F = W, R . We define some auxiliary notions. For any w ∈ W , let C(w) = {v ∈ W : wRv & vRw}. Call a set C a cluster if it is of the form C(w) for some w: the cluster generated by w. C(w) is simple if C(w) = {w}, and proper otherwise. w ∈ W is called minimal if vRw implies wRv for any v ∈ W . A cluster C is minimal if there exists a minimal w ∈ W such that C = C(w). Next, call F rooted if there is w ∈ W such that wRv for any v ∈ W : w is then a root of F. This w need not be unique: any point from C(w), the initial cluster of F, will do.
Evidently, a finite Kripke frame F is rooted iff it has only one minimal cluster. Topologically, this property is related to the earlier notion of connectedness. We said in Section 2.4 that a topological space W, τ is connected if its universe cannot be written as a union of two disjoint open sets. W, τ is well-connected if W = U ∪ V implies W = U or W = V , for any U, V ∈ τ . Obviously well-connectedness is a stronger notion than connectedness. It corresponds to W, R τ being rooted. For this observe that, dually, well-connectedness can be stated as follows:
For any two closed subsets C and
Lemma 4.12 A finite Kripke frame is rooted iff the corresponding topological space is well-connected.
Proof: Suppose W, R is a rooted Kripke frame with a root w, and W, τ R the corresponding topological space. Let X 1 and X 2 be closed sets of W, τ R such that X 1 ∩ X 2 = ∅. By an easy dualization of the notions of Section 3.1, a set X ⊆ W is topologically closed iff it is downward closed in the ordering, that is u ∈ X and vRu imply v ∈ X, for any u, v ∈ W . Now if both X 1 and X 2 are non-empty, then w belongs to both of them, which is a contradiction. Hence one of them should be empty, and W, τ R is well-connected.
Conversely, suppose W, R is not rooted. Then there are at least two different minimal clusters C 1 and C 2 in W . Since C 1 and C 2 are minimal clusters, they are downward closed, and hence closed in W, τ R . Moreover, since they are different,
This allows us to improve on Corollary 4.11.
Theorem 4.13 S4 is the logic of finite well-connected topological spaces.
Proof: It suffices to observe the following. If a modal formula has a counterexample on a finite Kripke model, it fails in some point there. But then by standard 'Locality', it also fails in the submodel generated by that point and its relational successors, which is rooted -and hence transforms into a well-connected topological space. q.e.d.
Again, there is a downside to such an upgraded completeness result. What it also means is that the basic modal language cannot define such a nice topological property as well-connectedness. As we saw in Section 2.4, the definition of connectedness requires introduction of additional modalities. So does well-connectedness.
Finally, let us mention that for refuting non-theorems of S4 it is enough to restrict ourselves to the class of those finite rooted models whose every cluster is proper. As we already mentioned in Section 3.1, having only simple clusters topologically corresponds to the T 0 separation axiom, which in finite case is equivalent to the T D separation axiom (every point is obtained as intersection of an open and a closed sets). Consequently, having only proper clusters would topologically correspond to the fact that no point can be obtained as intersection of an open and a closed sets. Call spaces with this property essentially non-T D . Then we can improve a little bit on Theorem 4.13:
Theorem 4.14 S4 is the logic of finite well-connected essentially non-T D topological spaces.
Proof: Suppose a modal formula ϕ has a counter-example on a finite rooted Kripke model M = W, R, |= . Then replacing every cluster of W by an nelement cluster, where n is the maximum among the sizes of the clusters of W , we obtain a new frame W , R . Obviously W, R is a p-morphic image of W , R . This allows us to define |= on W , R so that ϕ has also a counter-example on M = W , R , |= . Now every cluster of W is proper, hence W , R transforms into a well-connected essentially non-T D topological space. q.e.d.
Completeness on the reals
As early as 1944, McKinsey and Tarski proved the following beautiful result, which is an expansion of a completeness theorem by Tarski for intuitionistic propositional logic from 1938:
Theorem 5.1 (McKinsey-Tarski) S4 is the complete logic of any metric separable dense-in-itself space.
Most importantly, this theorem implies completeness of S4 with respect to the real line R. It also implies completeness of S4 with respect to the Cantor space C.
Our paper does not present any startling new results improving on this theorem. It rather takes a systematic look at its proof, and what it achieves. The original algebraic proof in [16] was very complex, the later more topological version in [18] is not much more accessible. Recently, Mints [17] replaced these by a much more perspicuous model-theoretic construction, extending earlier ideas of Beth and Kripke to get faster completeness of S4 with respect to the Cantor space. We generalize its model-theoretic structure, using the topo-bisimulations of Section 2, and also provide a modification for completeness on the reals.
Our strategy in the following subsections starts from the standard modal completeness for S4 involving counter-examples on finite rooted models, and then exhibits a topo-bisimulation resulting in "tree-like" topological model homeomorphic to the Cantor space C. We then show how to extract completeness of S4 with respect to the reals from the completeness of S4 with respect to C.
Cantorization
Our starting point is an arbitrary modal formula which is not provable in S4. We have already seen that such a non-theorem can be refuted on a finite rooted Kripke model. Now we will show how to transform the latter into a counterexample on the Cantor space C. Our technique is selective unraveling, a refinement of the technique of unraveling in modal logic.
Suppose M = W, R, |= is a finite rooted model with a root w. Our goal is to select those infinite paths of M which are in a one-to-one correspondence with infinite paths of the full infinite binary tree T 2 . In order to give an easier description of our construction, we assume that every cluster of W is proper. This can be done by Theorem 4.14. Now start with a root w, and announce (w) as a selective path. Then if (w 1 , . . . , w k ) is already a selective path, introduce a left move by announcing (w 1 , . . . , w k , w k ) as a selective path; and introduce a right move by announcing (w 1 , . . . , w k , w k+1 ) as a selective path if w k Rw k+1 and w k = w k+1 . (Since we assumed that every cluster of W is proper, such w k+1 will exist for every w k .)
To make this idea precise, we need some definitions. For u, v ∈ W , call v a strong successor of u if uRv and u = v. Write SSuc(u) for the set of all strong successors of u. Since we assumed that every cluster of W is proper, SSuc(u) = ∅ for every u ∈ W . Suppose v 1 , . . . , v n is a complete enumeration of SSuc(u) for every u ∈ W . Now define a selective path of W recursively: 1 (w) is a selective path;
is a selective path of length k + 1, where w k+1 = w k ;
3 If (w 1 , . . . , w k ) is a selective path of length k, then (w 1 , . . . , w k , w k+1 ) is a selective path of length k+1, where
Denote by Σ the set of all infinite selective paths of W . For a finite selective path (w 1 , . . . , w k ), let
Define topology τ Σ on Σ by introducing
To see that B Σ is a basis, observe that B (w) = Σ, and that
In order to define |= Σ note that every infinite selective path σ of W either gets stable or keeps cycling. In other words, either σ = (w 1 , . . . , w k , w k , . . . ), or σ = (w 1 , . . . , w n , w n+1 , . . . ), where w i belongs to some cluster C ⊆ W for i > n. In the former case we say that w k stabilizes σ, and in the latterthat σ keeps cycling in C. Now define |= Σ on Σ by putting
ρ(C) |= P if σ keeps cycling in C ⊆ W, where ρ(C) is some arbitrarily chosen representative of C.
All we need to show is that Σ, τ Σ is homeomorphic to the Cantor space, and that M Σ = Σ, τ Σ , |= Σ is topo-bisimilar to the initial M . In order to show the first claim, let us recall that the Cantor space is homeomorphic to the countable topological product of the two element set 2 = {0, 1} with the discrete topology. So, C ∼ = 2 ω with the subbasic sets for the topology being U = i∈ω U i , where all but one U i coincide with 2, or equivalently with the basic sets for the topology being U = i∈ω U i , where all but finitely many U i coincide with 2.
To picture the Cantor space, one can think of the full infinite binary tree T 2 : starting at the root, one associates 0 to every left-son of a node and 1 to every right-son. Then the points of the Cantor space are the infinite branches of T 2 .
Proof. Suppose σ = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , . . . , w k , . . . ) ∈ Σ, where w 1 = w is a root of W . With each w k (k > 1) associate 0 if w k−1 = w k , and associate 1 if w k is a strong successor of w k−1 . Denote an element of 2 associated with w k by g(w k ) and define G : Σ → 2 ω by putting
It should be clear from the definition that G is a bijection. In order to prove that it is a homeomorphism, we need to check that G is open. So, suppose B (w 1 ,...,w k ) is a basic open set of τ Σ . Then
is a basic open of C, G preserves basic opens, hence preserves opens. Conversely, suppose U = 2 k−1 × {c k } × 2 ω , where c k = 0 or 1, is a subbasic open of C. Then
which obviously belongs to τ Σ . Thus, G is open, hence a homeomorphism.
It is left to be shown that M Σ is topo-bisimilar to M . Define F : Σ → W by putting
Obviously F is well-defined, and is actually surjective. (For any w k ∈ W , F (σ 0 , w k , w k , . . . ) = w k , where σ 0 is a (finite) selective path from w 1 to w k .) Proposition 5.3 F is a total topo-bisimulation between M Σ = Σ, τ Σ , |= Σ and M = W, R, |= .
Proof.
Recall from the previous section that with W, R is associated a finite topological space W, τ R (since W, R is rooted, W, τ R is actually well-connected). Let us check that
which is an element of τ Σ . Indeed, suppose σ ∈ k∈ω, vRw k B (w 1 ,...,w k ) . Then σ belongs to one of B (w 1 ,...,w k ) with vRw k . But then w k RF (σ), which together with vRw k and transitivity of R imply that vRF (σ). So,
, and vRF (σ). Now either w k stabilizes σ, or σ keeps cycling in a cluster C. In the former case, σ = (w 1 , . . . , w k , w k , . . . ), where w k = F (σ). Hence, σ ∈ B (w 1 ,...,w k ) with vRw k . In the latter case, σ = (w 1 , . . . , w n , w n+1 , . . . ), where w i ∈ C for i > n, and F (σ) = ρ(C). Hence, σ ∈ B (w 1 ,...,wn,w n+1 ) with vRw n+1 . In either case,
. Therefore, F −1 (R(v)) = k∈ω, vRw k B (w 1 ,...,w k ) , and F is continuous. In order to show that F preserves opens, consider any basic set B (w 1 ,...,w k ) of τ Σ and show that F (B (w 1 ,...,w k ) ) is open in τ R . For this we show that
Suppose v ∈ F (B (w 1 ,...,w k ) ). Then there exists σ = (w 1 , . . . , w k , . . . ) ∈ B (w 1 ,...,w k ) such that F (σ) = v. Hence w k Rv. Conversely, suppose w k Rv. Consider a (finite) selective path σ 0 from w 1 to v containing (w 1 , . . . , w k ) as an initial segment.
Moreover, as follows from the definition of |= Σ ,
Now since every continuous and open map satisfying this condition is a topo-bisimulation (see [1] ), so is our F . q.e.d.
Theorem 5.4 S4 is complete with respect to the Cantor space.
Proof. Suppose S4 ϕ. Then by Theorem 4.13 there is a finite rooted Kripke model M refuting ϕ. By Theorem 4.14 we can assume that every cluster of M is proper. By Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 there exists a valuation |= C on the Cantor set C such that C, |= C is topo-bisimilar to M . Hence, ϕ is refuted on C. q.e.d.
Counterexamples on the reals
In the previous subsection we described how selective unraveling transforms counterexamples on a finite rooted Kripke model M into counterexamples on the Cantor space C. In this subsection we show how to transfer counterexamples from M to (0, 1). As a result, we obtain a new proof of completeness of S4 with respect to the real line.
Our strategy is similar to that in Section 5.1: we start with a nontheorem of S4 having a counterexample on a finite rooted Kripke model M = W, R, |= whose every cluster is proper. Then we construct the set Σ of all selective paths of W , and subtract a proper subset Λ of Σ, which is in a one-to-one correspondence with (0, 1). After that we define a topology τ Λ on Λ so that Λ, τ Λ is homeomorphic to (0, 1) with its natural topology. Finally, we define a valuation |= Λ on Λ, and show that Λ, τ Λ , |= Λ is topobisimilar to M . Note that since τ Λ is pretty different from τ Σ , the topobisimulation between Λ, τ Λ , |= Λ and M is not simply the restriction of the topo-bisimulation between Σ, τ Σ , |= Σ and M constructed in Section 5.1, but rather its appropriate modification.
Recall from Section 5.1 that in selective unraveling we had three different types of selective branches: going infinitely to the left, infinitely to the right, or infinitely zigzagging. Also recall that a selective branch σ is going infinitely to the left if σ = (w 1 , . . . , w k , w k , . . . ); σ is going infinitely to the right if σ = (w 1 , . . . , w n , w n+1 , . . . ), where w k+1 is a strong successor of w k for any k ≥ n; and finally, σ is zigzagging if σ = (w 1 , . . . , w n , w n+1 , . . . ), where there are infinitely many k ≥ n with w k+1 = w k , and there are also infinitely many k ≥ n with w k+1 being a strong successor of w k .
In order to transfer counterexamples from M to (0, 1), in the definition of selective unraveling we need to restrict ourselves only to those branches which are either going infinitely to the left or are infinitely zigzagging. In other words, we define a real path of W to be a selective path of W which is either going infinitely to the left or is infinitely zigzagging.
Denote by Π the set of all real infinite paths of W . So, Π is the subset of the set Σ of all selective infinite paths of W consisting of all selective paths going infinitely to the left or infinitely zigzagging. Hence, Π is in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of those infinite branches of the infinite binary tree T 2 which either have 0 from some node on or are infinitely zigzagging.
This correspondence sets desired connection between Π and (0, 1). To see this recall the dyadic representation of a number from [0, 1] . Let x ∈ [0, 1].
To construct an infinite branch α = (a n ) n∈ω of T 2 representing x observe that either x ∈ [0, . Again in the former case put a 2 = 0 and in the latter case put a 2 = 1. Continuing this process, we will get an infinite branch α = (a n ) n∈ω of T 2 representing x.
Note that there are two ways for the dyadic representation of (a 1 , . . . , a k , 1, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) or as (a 1 , . . . , a k , 0, 1, 1, 1, . . . ) . Therefore, if we throw away all infinite branches of T 2 having 1 from some node on plus (0, 0, 0, . . . ), we obtain a one-to-one correspondence between (0, 1) and the remaining infinite branches of T 2 . Hence, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between (0, 1) and Λ = Π − {(w, w, w, . . . )}.
Suppose (w 1 , . . . ,
In order to transfer topological structure of (0, 1) to Λ observe that the family {( m 2 n , m+1 2 n ) : m, n ∈ ω, 0 < m + 1 < 2 n } forms a basis for the topology on (0, 1), and that the subset of Λ representing (
Hence, if we define topology τ Λ on Λ by introducing {D (w 1 ,...,w k ) : (w 1 , . . . , w k ) is a finite selective path of Λ} as a basis, the following obvious fact holds:
Now we define |= Λ on Λ, and show that there exists a topo-bisimulation between (Λ, τ Λ , |= Λ ) and M .
In order to define |= Λ observe that either λ ∈ Λ gets stable or it keeps cycling. In other words, either λ = (w 1 , . . . , w k−1 , w k , w k , . . . ), or λ = (w 1 , . . . , w n , w n+1 , . . . ), where w i belongs to some cluster C ⊆ W , for i > n. In the former case we say that w k stabilizes λ, and in the latter -that λ keeps cycling in C. Now define |= Λ on Λ by putting
ρ(C) |= P if λ keeps cycling in C ⊆ W, where ρ(C) is some arbitrarily chosen representative of C.
Finally define a function F : Λ → W by putting
Proposition 5.6 F is a total topo-bisimulation between M Λ = Λ, τ Λ , |= Λ and M = W, R, |= .
Proof. Obviously F is well-defined, and is actually surjective. (For any w k ∈ W , F (w 1 , . . . , w k , w k+1 , w k+1 , . . . ) = w k , where (w 1 , . . . , w k ) is a finite selective path from w 1 to w k , and w k+1 is a strong successor w k . Note that w k+1 exists, since every cluster of W is proper.) Let us check that 
which is an element of τ Λ . Indeed, suppose λ ∈ k∈ω, vRw k D (w 1 ,...,w k ) . Then λ belongs to one of D (w 1 ,...,w k ) with vRw k . Now λ ∈ D (w 1 ,...,w k ) implies w k RF (λ), which together with vRw k and transitivity of R yield vRF (λ). Hence, F (λ) ∈ R(v), and λ ∈ F −1 (R(v)). Conversely, suppose λ ∈ F −1 (R(v)). Then F (λ) ∈ R(v), and vRF (λ). Now either λ is going infinitely to the left or is infinitely zigzagging. In the former case, λ = (w 1 , . . . , w k , w k+1 , w k+1 , . . . ), where w k = F (λ). Hence, λ ∈ D (w 1 ,...,w k ) with vRw k . In the latter case, λ = (w 1 , . . . , w n , w n+1 , w n+2 , . . . ), where F (λ) ∈ C(w n+1 ). Hence, λ ∈ D (w 1 ,...,wn,w n+1 ) with vRw n+1 . In either case, λ ∈ k∈ω, vRw k D (w 1 ,...,w k ) , and F −1 (R(v)) = k∈ω, vRw k D (w 1 ,...,w k ) . Hence, F is continuous. In order to show that F preserves opens, consider any basic set D (w 1 ,...,w k ) of τ Λ and show that F (D (w 1 ,...,w k ) ) is open in τ R . For this we show that
Suppose v ∈ F (D (w 1 ,...,w k ) ). Then there exists λ = (w 1 , . . . , w k , . . . ) ∈ D (w 1 ,...,w k ) such that F (λ) = v. Now either λ is going infinitely to the left or is infinitely zigzagging. In the former case, λ = (w 1 , . . . , w k , . . . , w k+l , w k+l+1 , w k+l+1 , . . . ), where w k+l = v. In the latter case, v is a representative of a cluster C where λ keeps cycling. In either case, w k Rv. Hence, v ∈ R(w k ). Conversely, suppose v ∈ R(w k ). Then w k Rv. Consider λ = (w 1 , . . . , w k , . . . , v, u, u, . . . ), where (w 1 , . . . , w k , . . . , v) is a finite selective path of W from w 1 to v containing (w 1 , . . . , w k ) as an initial segment, and u is a strong successor of v. (u exists, since every cluster of W is proper.) Then λ ∈ D (w 1 ,...,w k ) and F (λ) = v. Hence F (D (w 1 ,. ..,w k ) ) = R(w k ), which is a basic open of τ R . So, F is open.
Moreover, as follows from the definition of |= Λ , λ |= Λ P iff F (λ) |= P. Now since every continuous and open map satisfying this condition is a topo-bisimulation (see [1] ), so is our F . q.e.d.
Corollary 5.7 S4 is complete with respect to (0, 1).
Proof. Suppose S4 ϕ. Then by Theorem 4.13 there is a finite rooted Kripke model M refuting ϕ. By Theorem 4.14 we can assume that every cluster of M is proper. By Proposition 5.6, M is topo-bisimilar to M Λ = Λ, τ Λ , |= Λ . Hence, M Λ is refuting ϕ. Now since Λ, τ Λ is homeomorphic to (0, 1), ϕ is refuted on (0, 1). q.e.d. Proof. Enumerate all the non-theorems of S4. This can be done since the language of S4 is countable. Let this enumeration be {ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . }. Since the interval (n, n + 1) is homeomorphic to R, from Theorem 5.8 it follows that there exists a valuation ν n on (n, n+1) such that (n, n+1), ν n falsifies ϕ n . (Note that we need not know anything about the shape of ν n (ϕ n ).) Now take n∈ω (n, n + 1). For any propositional letter P let ν(P ) = n∈ω ν n (P ) be the valuation of P on R. Note that each (n, n + 1), ν n is an open submodel of R, ν , where the 'identity embedding' is a topo-bisimulation. Hence, the truth values of modal formulas do not change moving from each (n, n + 1), ν n to R, ν . Therefore, ϕ n is still falsified on the whole R for each n. Thus, we have constructed a single valuation ν on R falsifying all the non-theorems of S4. q.e.d.
This also shows that though very different from the standard canonical Kripke model of S4, R shares some of its universal properties.
Logical non-finiteness on the reals
Recall that two formulas ϕ and ψ are said to be S4-equivalent if S4 ϕ ↔ ψ. It is well known that there exist infinitely many formulas of one-variable which are not S4-equivalent. E.g., consider the following list of formulas:
We can easily construct a Kripke model on which all ϕ n have different interpretations. Let M = ω, R, |= , where ω denotes the set of all natural numbers, nRm iff m ≤ n, and n |= P iff n is odd. Then one can readily check that ϕ n is true at all odd points > n. Hence every ϕ n has a different interpretation on M . It implies that the ϕ n are not S4-equivalent. Now we will give a topological flavor to this result by showing that interpreting a propositional variable as a certain subset of R allows us to construct infinitely many S4-nonequivalent formulas of one variable. Corollary 5.9 already told us such a uniform choice must exist, but the proof does not construct ν(P ) explicitly. The following argument does, and thereby also highlights the topological content of our modal completeness theorem.
We use 3 and 2 instead of the standard notations () and Int() for the closure and interior operators of a topological space. This modal notation shows its basic use in topology because it allows us to write topological formulas in a much more perspicuous fashion.
To proceed further we need to recall the definition of Hausdorff's residue of a given set. Suppose a topological space W, τ and X ⊆ W are given. (X) = X ∩ 3(3X − X) is called the Hausdorff residue of X. Let 0 (X) = X, 1 (X) = (X) and n+1 (X) = n (X).
X is said to be of rank n, written r(X) = n, if n is the least natural number such that n (X) = ∅. X is said to be of finite rank if there exists a natural n such that X is of rank n. X is said to be of infinite rank if it is not of finite rank.
x ∈ X is said to be of rank n if x ∈ n (X), but x / ∈ n+1 (X). x ∈ X is said to be of finite rank if there exists a natural n such that x is of rank n. x is said to be of infinite rank if it is not of finite rank.
Obviously X is of rank n iff the rank of every element of X is strictly less than n, and there is at least one element of X of rank n − 1; X is of finite rank iff there is a natural n such that the rank of every element of X is strictly less than n; and X is of infinite rank iff there is no finite bound on the ranks of elements of X.
It is obvious that if we interpret P as a subset X of R, then ϕ n will be interpreted as n (X). So, in order to show that different ϕ n are S4-nonequivalent, it is sufficient to show that there is X ⊂ R such that (X) ⊃ 2 (X) ⊃ · · · ⊃ n (X) ⊃ . . . . Indeed, we have the following Proposition 5.10 There exists a subset X of R such that (X) ⊃ 2 (X) ⊃ · · · ⊃ n (X) ⊃ . . . .
Proof:
We will construct X inductively. Fix a natural number k.
Step 1: Consider a sequence {x i 1 } ∞ i 1 =1 from (k − 1, k) converging to k − 1, and put
where {y
is a sequence from (x i 1 +1 , x i 1 ) converging to x i 1 +1 . Note that
, and
So, k − 1 is the only point of X 1 of rank 1, and r(X 1 ) = 2.
Step 2: Consider a sequence {x
) converging to y i 1 i 2 +1 , and put
. Note that X 2 ⊃ X 1 , and
, and 2 (X 2 ) = {k − 1}.
So, the points of X 2 of rank 1 are y
, for arbitrary i 1 and i 2 , k − 1 is the only point of X 2 of rank 2, and r(X 2 ) = 3.
Step n: For n ≥ 1 consider a sequence {x 
. . .
Then note that X n ⊃ X n−1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ X 2 ⊃ X 1 , and
So, the points of X n of rank 1 are
the points of X n of rank 2 are
and so on; finally, k − 1 is the only point of X n of rank n, and r(X n ) = n + 1. Now let X 1 be constructed in (0, 1), X 2 in (1, 2), X n in (n − 1, n), and so on. We put
Then it is obvious that n − 1 ∈ n (X) and n − 1 / ∈ n+1 (X), for any natural n. So, (X) ⊃ 2 (X) ⊃ · · · ⊃ n (X) ⊃ . . . , and X contains points of every finite rank. q.e.d.
Remark 5.11
It is worth to be noted that the X constructed above does not contain elements of infinite rank. However, a little adjustment of the above construction will allow us to construct a subset of R with an element of infinite rank. Actually, it is possible to construct a subset of R containing elements of rank α, for any ordinal α < ℵ 1 .
Returning to our list of formulas, with P as the just constructed X, the interpretation of every ϕ n in R will be different, in terms of some topologically significant phenomenon. In the next section we will show that if we restrict ourselves to only "good" subsets of R, then the situation will be drastically changed.
Axiomatizing special kinds of regions
As we saw in the previous section, by interpreting propositional variables as certain subsets of the real line R, we can refute every non-theorem of S4 on R. Certainly not all subsets of R are required for refuting the non-theorems of S4. In this section, we will analyze the complexity of the subsets of R required for refuting the non-theorems of S4. Similarly to Section 5.5, we prefer to use 3 and 2 to denote the closure and interior operators of a topological space. For consistency we also use ∧, ∨ and ¬ to denote settheoretical intersection, union and complement.
Serial sets on the real line
To start with, consider subsets of R with the simplest intuitive structure. Call X ⊆ R convex if all points lying in between any two points of X belong to X. In other words, X is convex if x, y ∈ X and x ≤ y imply [x, y] ⊆ X. Every convex subset of R has one of the following forms:
Definition 6.1 Call a subset of R serial if it is a finite union of convex subsets of R. Denote the set of all serial subsets of R by S(R). So, S(R) = {X ∈ P(R) : X is a serial subset of R}.
Obviously the X constructed in Proposition 5.10 is not serial, and actually this was absolutely crucial in showing that X had points of any finite rank. Indeed, we have the following Lemma 6.2 r(X) = 0 for any X ∈ S(R). Now let X be a serial subset of R. Then X = n i=1 X i , where every X i is a convex subset of R, and actually we can assume that all X i are disjoint. But then (X) = n i=1 (X i ) = ∅, and hence r(X) = 0. q.e.d. It follows that if we interpret P as a serial subset of R, then no two ϕ n (n ≥ 1) from the previous section define sets equal to each other.
Call a valuation ν of our language L to subsets of R serial if ν(P ) ∈ S(R) for any propositional variable P . Since S(R) is closed with respect to ¬, ∧ and 3, we have that ν(ϕ) ∈ S(R) for any serial valuation ν. Call a formula ϕ S-true if it is true in R under a serial valuation. Call ϕ S-valid if ϕ is S-true for any serial valuation on R. Let L(S) = {ϕ : ϕ is S-valid}.
Fact 6.3 L(S) is a normal modal logic over S4.
Obviously all ϕ n (n ≥ 1) from the previous section are L(S)-equivalent. So, it is natural to expect that there are only finitely many formulas in one variable which are L(S)-nonequivalent, and indeed that L(S) is a much stronger logic than S4.
As a first step in this direction, we show that the Grzegorczyk axiom
belongs to L(S).
Fact 6.4 Grz is S-valid.
Proof. Grz is S-valid iff X ⊆ 3(X ∧ ¬3(3X ∧ ¬X)) for any X ∈ S(R).
As a next step, we show that the axioms
bounding the depth and the width of a Kripke model to 2, are S-valid.
Fact 6.5 BD 2 and BW 2 are S-valid.
Proof: Note that BD 2 is S-valid iff 3X ∧ ¬X ⊆ 32X for any X ∈ S(R), and that BW 2 is S-valid iff X∧Y ∧3(X∧¬Y )∧3(Y ∧¬X)∧3(¬X∧¬Y ) = ∅ for any X, Y ∈ S(R).
To show that 3X ∧ ¬X ⊆ 32X for any X ∈ S(R), suppose x ∈ 3X ∧ ¬X. Then x is a limit point of X not belonging to X. Since X is serial, there is y ∈ R such that either y < x and (y, x) ⊆ X, or x < y and (x, y) ⊆ X. In both cases it is obvious that x ∈ 32X. So, 3X ∧ ¬X ⊆ 32X.
To
∈ 2X and x / ∈ 2Y . Hence there exist y, z ∈ R such that y < x < z and (y, z) ∩ (¬X ∧ ¬Y ) = ∅, which means that x / ∈ 3(¬X ∧ ¬Y ). So,
The following is an immediate consequence of our observations.
In order to prove the converse, and hence complete our axiomatization of the logic of serial subsets of R, observe that S4⊕Grz⊕BD 2 ⊕BW 2 is actually the complete modal logic of the following '2-fork' Kripke frame W, R , where W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 } and w 1 Rw 1 , w 2 Rw 2 , w 3 Rw 3 , w 1 Rw 2 , w 1 Rw 3 :
Indeed, it is well known that Grz is valid on a Kripke frame iff it is a Noetherian partial order, that BD 2 is valid on a partially ordered Kripke frame iff its depth is bounded by 2, and that BW 2 is valid on a partially ordered Kripke frame of a depth ≤ 2 iff its width is bounded by 2. Now, denoting the logic of W, R by L( W, R ), we have the following:
Grz is a theorem of L, every L-frame is a Noetherian partial order. Since BD 2 is a theorem of L, every L-frame is of the depth ≤ 2, hence L has the f.m.p., and thus is complete with respect to finite rooted partially ordered Kripke frames of depth ≤ 2. Since BW 2 is a theorem of L, it is obvious that the width of finite rooted L-frames is also ≤ 2. But then it is routine to check that every such frame is a p-morphic image of W, R . Hence L( W, R ) ⊆ L, and L = L( W, R ). q.e.d.
As a final move, we show that W, τ R is an open and serial image of R, meaning that there is an open map f : R → W such that f −1 (X) ∈ S(R) for any subset X of W .
Recall that τ R consists of the upward closed subsets of W , which obviously are ∅, {w 2 }, {w 3 }, {w 2 , w 3 }, and W . Fix any x ∈ R and define f : R → W by putting f (y) =    w 1 for y = x, w 2 for y < x, w 3 for y > x.
Then it is routine to check that As a trivial consequence of this observation, we obtain that for every valuation |= on W, R there is a serial valuation |= S on R such that W, R, |= is topo-bisimilar to R, |= S . Hence, every non-theorem of L( W, R ) is a non-theorem of L(S), and we have the following:
Combining Corollaries 6.6 and 6.8 and Theorem 6.7 one obtains:
Formulas in one variable over the serial sets
This section provides some more concrete information on 'serial sets'. As L(S) is the logic of the finite '2-fork' frame, for every natural number n ≥ 0, there are only finitely many L(S)-nonequivalent formulas built from the variables P 1 , . . . , P n . In this subsection we show that there are exactly 64 L(S)-nonequivalent formulas in one variable, and describe them all. Theorem 6.10 Every formula in one variable is L(S)-equivalent to a disjunction of the following six formulas:
Hence, there are exactly 64 L(S)-nonequivalent formulas in one variable.
Proof. In line with our interest in tying up 'modal' and 'topological' ways of thinking, we will give two different proofs of this result. One proceeds by constructing the 1-universal Kripke model of L(S), which is a standard technique in modal logic, the other is purely topological, using some obvious observations on serial subsets of R. Here w n |= P iff n is even. Now one can readily check that each point of W (1) corresponds to one of the six formulas in the condition of the theorem. Hence every formula in one variable is L(S)-equivalent to a disjunction of the above six formulas. Since there are exactly 2 6 different subsets of W (1), we obtain that there are exactly 64 L(S)-nonequivalent formulas in one variable.
Second Proof.
Observe that there exists a serial subset X of R such that 2X = 2¬X = X ∧ 23¬X = ¬X ∧ 23X = X ∧ 32¬X ∧ 32X = ¬X ∧ 32X ∧ 32¬X. For example, let x < y < z < u, and take X = [x, y) ∪ (y, z) ∪ {u}. Then one can readily check that
Hence, we can always interpret P as a serial subset of R such that all the six formulas of the theorem correspond to different serial subsets of R. Now, let us prove that every subset of R obtained by repeatedly applying ¬, ∧, 2 to a serial set X is equal to a finite (including the empty) union of the following serial subsets:
For this first observe that T i ∧ T j = ∅ if i = j, and that 6 i=1 T i = R. So, these six serial subsets of R are mutually disjoint and jointly exhaustive. Next observe that ¬T i = T j ∨ T k ∨ T l ∨ T m ∨ T n , where i, j, k, l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} are different from each other. Finally observe that 2T 1 = T 1 ,
Hence every subset of R obtained by repeatedly applying ¬, ∧, 2 to {T 1 , . . . , T 6 } is a finite (including the empty) union of {T 1 , . . . , T 6 }.
Now suppose Y ⊆ R is obtained by repeatedly applying ¬, ∧, 2 to X. We prove by induction on the complexity of Y that Y is equal to a finite (including the empty) union of {T 1 , . . . , T 6 }.
Base case. Since X = T 1 ∨ T 3 ∨ T 5 (and ¬X = T 2 ∨ T 4 ∨ T 6 ), the base case (that is when Y = X) is obvious.
Since every ¬T i j is equal to is =i j T is , using the distributivity law we obtain that Y = is,it∈{1,...,6} (T is ∧T it ). Since for different i s and i t , T is ∧T it = ∅, which is the empty union of T i s, we finally obtain that Y is a finite union of {T 1 , . . . , T 6 }.
. . , j m ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. Similarly to the above case, using the distributivity law we obtain that Y is a finite union of {T 1 , . . . , T 6 }.
. . , T 6 } is closed with respect to 2, we obtain that Y is a finite union of {T 1 , . . . , T 6 }.
Hence, every subset of R obtained by repeatedly applying ¬, ∧, 2 to a serial set X is equal to a finite (including the empty) union of {T 1 , . . . , T 6 }. Since there are exactly 2 6 different subsets obtained as a union of {T 1 , . . . , T 6 }, we obtain that there are exactly 64 different subsets of R obtained by repeatedly applying ¬, ∧, 2 to a serial set X. This directly implies that there are exactly 64 L(S)-nonequivalent formulas in one variable. q.e.d.
The same technique can also be used to prove the normal form theorem over L(S) for every formula with more than one proposition variable.
Countable unions of convex sets on the real line
Let us now be a bit more systematic. By Theorem 5.8, S4 is the complete logic of R, and hence sets of reals suffice as values ν(P ) in refuting nontheorems. But how complex must these sets be? In first-order logic, e.g., we know that completeness requires atomic predicates over the integers which are at least ∆ 0 2 . With only simpler predicates in the arithmetic hierarchy, the logic gets richer. In a topological space like R, it seems reasonable to look at the Borel Hierarchy G. How high up do we have to go for our S4-counterexamples? One could analyze our construction in Section 5.3 to have an upper bound. But here, we will state some more direct information.
Consider the set τ of all open subsets of R. Let B(τ ) denote the Boolean closure of τ . Since B(τ ) contains all closed subsets of R, it is obvious that B(τ ) is closed with respect to 3. Obviously S(R) is properly contained in B(τ ). It is natural to ask whether the elements of B(τ ) are enough for refuting all the non-theorems of S4. The answer is negative: the modal logic is still richer.
Fact 6.11 [9] The complete logic of B(τ ) is Grz.
Hence, we need to seek something bigger than B(τ ). Let C ∞ (R) denote the set of countable unions of convex subsets of R. Since every open subset of R is a countable union of open intervals, it is obvious that τ ⊆ C ∞ (R). Let B(C ∞ (R)) denote the Boolean closure of C ∞ (R). Since τ ⊆ C ∞ (R), we also have B(τ ) ⊆ B(C ∞ (R)). It follows that B(C ∞ (R)) is also closed with respect to 3. Moreover, B(τ ) is properly contained in B(C ∞ (R)), since the set Q of rationals belongs to B(C ∞ (R)) but does not belong to B(τ ).
Theorem 6.12 [9] S4 is the complete logic of B(C ∞ (R)).
So, the Boolean combinations of countable unions of convex subsets of R are all we need for refuting the non-theorems of S4. Since every countable union of convex subsets of R belongs to the Borel hierarchy G 2 over the opens of R, very low level of the Borel hierarchy suffices for refuting the non-theorems of S4. So, G itself is more than sufficient for refuting the non-theorems of S4.
Summarizing, we constructed five Boolean algebras of subsets of R forming a chain under inclusion: S(R) ⊂ B(τ ) ⊂ B(C ∞ (R)) ⊂ G ⊂ P(R), where S(R) is the Boolean algebra of all serial subsets of R, B(τ ) the Boolean closure of the set of all open subsets of R, B(C ∞ (R)) the Boolean closure of the set of all countable unions of convex subsets of R, G the Boolean algebra of all Borel subsets of R, and P(R) the power-set of R. All of these Boolean algebras are closed with respect to 3. The modal logic of the last three algebras is S4, that of the second one is Grz, and the modal logic of the first is the logic of the '2-fork' Kripke frame.
Generalization to R 2
In this final subsection, we shift aim in a different direction. We generalize our results on the serial subsets of R to the chequered subsets of R 2 , and indicate further generalizations to any Euclidean space R n .
A set X ⊆ R 2 is convex if all points laying in between any two points of X belong to X. It is said to be serial if X is a finite union of convex subsets of R 2 . Denote the set of all serial subsets of R 2 by S(R 2 ).
Here is a real difference between R and R 2 . Unlike S(R), S(R 2 ) is not closed with respect to complement. For instance, a full circle is obviously a convex subset of R 2 . However, its complement is not serial.
One natural way of overcoming this difficulty is to work with a smaller family of chequered subsets of R 2 , which also has a reasonable claim to being 'the two-dimensional generalization of the one-dimensional serial sets'.
A set X ⊆ R 2 is a rectangular convex if X = X 1 × X 2 , where both X 1 and X 2 are convex subsets of R [5] . It is easy to see that every rectangular convex is a convex set in the usual sense, but not vice versa: a circle is not a rectangular convex.
A set X ⊆ R 2 is said to be chequered if it is a finite union of rectangular convex subsets of R 2 . Denote the set of all chequered subsets of R 2 by CH(R 2 ). Obviously CH(R 2 ) ⊂ S(R 2 ).
Note that unlike S(R 2 ), CH(R 2 ) does form a Boolean algebra. Moreover, 2X, 3X ∈ CH(R 2 ) for any X ∈ CH(R 2 ).
Fact 6.13 CH(R 2 ) forms a Boolean algebra closed with respect to 2 and 3.
Proof. In order to show that CH(R 2 ) forms a Boolean algebra it is sufficient to show that CH(R 2 ) is closed with respect to ¬. For this observe that complement of a rectangular convex is union of at most four rectangular convexes, and that finite intersection of rectangular convexes is again a rectangular convex. Now suppose A ∈ CH(R 2 ). Then there exist rectangular convexes
¬A i , which is a chequered set by the above observation and the distributivity law.
Since CH(R 2 ) forms a Boolean algebra, in order to show that CH(R 2 ) is closed with respect to 2 and 3, it is sufficient to check that CH(R 2 ) is closed with respect to 3. For the latter observe that the closure of a rectangular convex is again a rectangular convex, and that the closure commutes with finite unions. Now suppose A ∈ CH(R 2 ). Then there exist rectangular convexes
which is a chequered set by the above observation. q.e.d.
Hence, interpreting propositional variables as chequered subsets of R 2 , every formula of our language will be also interpreted as a chequered subset of R 2 .
i=0 3X i . Then x is a limit point of all X i . Since there are five X i , and every X i belongs to CH(R 2 ), there should exist X i and X j such that x is a limit point of
As an immediate consequence we obtain that L(CH) Grz, BD 3 , BW 4 . Hence, like L(S), L(CH) is also a tabular logic. In a similar fashion, by induction on the dimension of R n , we can prove that the logic of chequered subsets of R n is also tabular. In particular, it validates BD n+1 and BW 2 n . Hence, we are capable of capturing the dimension of Euclidean spaces. For more details in this direction we refer to [3] .
7 A general picture
The deductive landscape
The logics that we have studied in this paper fit into a more general environment. Typical for modal logic is its lattice of deductive systems such as K, S4, S5 or GL. These form a large family describing different classes of relational frames, with often very different motivations (cf. the series of books "Advances in Modal Logic", CSLI and FOLLi). Among the uncountably many modal logics, a small number are distinguished for one of two reasons. Logics like S4 or S5 were originally proposed as syntactic proof theories for notions of modality, and then turned out to be semantically complete with respect to natural frame classes, such as (for S4) transitive reflexive orders. Other modal logics, however, were discovered as the complete theories of important frames, such as the natural numbers with their standard ordering. What about a similar landscape of modal logics on the topological interpretation?
Some well-known modal logics extending S4 indeed correspond to natural classes of topological spaces. E.g., it is easy to see that the 'identity logic' with axiom ϕ → 2ϕ axiomatizes the complete logic of all discrete spaces. And it also defines them semantically through the usual notion of frame correspondence -which can be lifted to the topological semantics in a straightforward manner. But already S5 corresponds to a less standard condition, viz. that every point has an open neighborhood all of whose points have x in all their open neighborhoods. (Alternatively, this says that every open set is closed.) Also, even rich topological spaces do not seem to validate very spectacular modal logics, witness the fact that R has just S4 for its modal theory. We did find stronger logics with 'general frames' though, i.e., frames with a designated interior algebra of subsets, such as R with the serial sets.
The latter turned out to be a well-known modal 'frame logic', and we have not been able so far to find really new modal logics arising on the topological interpretation.
A related question is what becomes of the known general results on completeness and correspondence for modal logic in the topological setting. There appear to be some obstacles here. E.g., the substitution method for Sahlqvist correspondence (cf. [10] ) has only a limited range. It does work for axioms like the above ϕ → 2ϕ, where it automatically generates the corresponding first-order condition (∀x)(∃U ∈ τ )(x ∈ U & (∀y ∈ U )(y = x)), i.e., discreteness. Likewise, it works for the S5 symmetry axiom P → 23P , where it produces the above-mentioned (∀x)(∃U ∈ τ )(x ∈ U & (∀y ∈ U )(∀V ∈ τ )(y ∈ V → x ∈ V )).
The method also works for antecedents of the form 2P -but things stop with antecedents like 3P or 22P . The reason is that, on the topological semantics, one modality 2 expresses a two-quantifier combination ∃U ∈ τ such that ∀x ∈ U, so that syntactic complexity builds up more rapidly than in standard modal logic, where each modality is one quantifier over relational successors of the current world. General correspondence or completeness results for topological modal logics therefore seem harder to obtain -and we may need different syntactic notions for them (see [14] for recent results in that direction).
The expressive landscape
In any case, the basic modal language seems too poor to express many properties of topological interest. One earlier example was connectedness. This property cannot be modally defined. To see this, suppose there was a modal formula ϕ defining the connected topological spaces in the sense of frame correspondence. Now consider the non-connected discrete 2-element space with universe {1, 2}. The formula ϕ must fail here under some valuation ν -say at point 1. Now consider the one-point model {1} copying 1's valuation. The link between just the worlds 1 in the two models is a topo-bisimulation, as is easy to see. But then, by modal invariance, ϕ would also fail in the connected one-point model: a contradiction.
As we have seen already, connectedness does have a definition in a modal language extended with a universal modality U ϕ saying that ϕ holds at all points of the topological space:
This is one instance of a general trend in modal logic, toward moderate expressive extensions of the base language. The {2, U } language is a natural candidate, as it can formulate 'global facts' about topological spaces such as inclusion of one region in another. Many of our earlier techniques apply such as frame correspondence, bisimulation and related model constructions. (Cf. ( [1] for back-up to this section.) The general logic of this new language is known [4] : it is the system S4+S5, being S4 for 2, S5 for U , plus the 'bridge axiom' U P → 2P . Moreover, according to [19] , we have natural extension of the McKinsey and Tarski theorem: the {2, U } modal theory of R, and indeed of every Euclidean space R n , is exactly S4+S5 plus the given connectedness axiom.
Thus, the concerns of this paper reproduce for richer modal languages, expressing more topological behavior. Most of the resulting questions seem completely open, as topological semantics does not seem to have had much of a follow-up in serious 'logic of space'.
Indeed, modal languages can also have much stronger topological modalities, such as the following 'Until' operator generalizing two well-known notions from temporal logic:
x has an open neighborhood all of whose interior points satisfy B while all its boundary points satisfy A.
And even further extensions are needed to deal with modal separation axioms, such as a space being Hausdorff, which requires even stronger 'modalities' definable in the monadic second-order language over topological spaces. One can then see the art of the field in choosing 'good fragments' out of this total language, admitting of a good balance between expressive power and complexity.
Finally, the same modal methodology also extends to other similarity types. In particular, one can introduce geometrical structure. E.g., the affine geometry of betweenness suggest a 'convexity modality' CA:
x lies in between two points that satisfy A.
This brings out differences between the spaces R n : as R, but no higherdimensional R n , satisfies the principle CCA ↔ CA. (A more extensive study of various modal languages for affine and metric geometry is made in [2] and [8] .) Thus, there is a lot of modal logic of space in between Tarski's work on topological structure and his work on the full first-order language of elementary geometry [20] .
